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Abstract: 
This paper develops a theoretical model of positive monopolist who organizes a two-sided 
market in the IP license industry. This model indicates, as a platform owner, they faced a new 
phenomenon that developers’ side acts as a supply chain of firms instead of single firm. They 
have to deal with network effect between developers and customers, but also within the 
supply chain. We have developed models by adopting license fee and royalty fee to facilitate 
such network effects among supply chain and customers in the platform ecosystem. This 
article specifically enriches the two-sided platform by introducing supply-chain based side. 
Some practical implications also provide for platform owners who want to set up their 
platform ecosystem by licensing their IPs. This result could also be able to explain why Intel 
adopted a close supply chain in the PC industry while ARM adopted an open platform model 
in the mobile industry as a positive monopolist.  
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1 Introduction 
The platform based business has been popular during last few years along with the 
development of new technologies infrastructure, for example, the apps online store, the 
search engine market, the e-commerce market as well as many video games(Zhu and Iansiti 
2012). All of these platform-based business are regarded as the two-sided market where the 
supplier and customers have positive or negative network effect to each other and then trigger 
the growth of platform business(Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006). 
The previous studies only addressed a very simple model, which has one side supplier and 
other side customer(Eisenmann et al. 2006, Rochet and Tirole 2006, Hagiu 2009, Cheng and 
Tang 2010). However, recently some case has experience a more complicated situation over 
that platform-based market. The partners in different sides are not fragmented, but works and 
connect as a supply chain. For example, ARM has deal with a supply-chain based two-sided 
market. This study explores the story of ARM, a semiconductor intellectual property (IP) 
supplier, whose success is due to its technological platform and business ecosystem. IP is a 
reusable unit of integrated circuit (IC or chip) design layout that performs some specific 
function and constitutes the fundamental architecture of chips used in digital products 
(Kaeslin, 2014). ARM’s IPs are licensed to third-party IC design firms to accelerate the 
design and lower the cost. Because of this, ARM functions as a technological platform 
provider and positions itself in the upstream of the semiconductor supply chain. ARM started 
as a small company with only 12 engineers in Cambridge, U.K., in the early 1990s. Today, it 
is the world's leading semiconductor IP supplier. Its IP architecture firmly dominates the 
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mobile phone microchip market (Burt, 2014). Thanks to its excellent business ecosystem 
nurturing strategy (ARM, 2014), it currently has more than 1000 partners in its community.   
In its platform, they not only dealt with the direct partners, but also support a supply-chain 
based group of partners. Those partners are all connected along the value chain and share the 
value proposition. As a result, this case cannot be easily simplified the supplier side just one 
unit, instead it is more a supply-chain based or more dynamic view as an ecosystem-based 
connected partners. This is so called a business ecosystem. The business ecosystem is an 
economic community, which composes of inter-dependent organizations, who co-evolve with 
each other and share the fate(Moore 1993, Adner and Kapoor 2010, Rong et al. 2015). This 
concept highlights the in-direct partners might contribute to the ecosystem platform and 
create the future business opportunities. So this concept expanded previous two-sided 
platform, into a more expanded scope namely as two-sided ecosystem.  
Following this logic, we have deeply analyzed the ARM case: How ARM use this business 
model build up a two-sided ecosystem/market composing of supply network as well as other 
indirect ecosystem partners. ARM’s unique business model is about its license business 
model. As a result, we try to explore how ARM build up the ecosystem by designing a 
well-balanced model of loyalty fee and license fee. 
This case will challenge the existing model about the network effect between single group of 
suppliers and customers. Alternatively, the model is to study the network effects between the 
supply chain and customers or indirect partners within the platform ecosystem. This model 
will use the combination model of loyalty and license fee as the pricing strategy to achieve 
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the following objectives: stimulate the innovation rate by providing the well-accepted 
package of license model; acquire the enough profit from this model to meet the further 
expansion for the technology platform owner; profit maximization of this two-sided market 
and its business ecosystem. 
In order to comprehensively under this new model, we also compare the different business 
model between ARM and Intel. Currently, Intel dominated the PC industry while ARM 
dominated the mobile industry. We also find that Intel has adopted a traditional monopoly 
strategy and conduct a close supply chain model while ARM adopted a supply-chain based 
open platform model and get the benefit from strong network effects. 
The following parts of this paper are structured as follows: the second party is literature 
review which covers the two-sided market, supply-network based two-sided market and 
pricing strategy. The third part is about case study. The fourth party is to develop the 
theoretical model on the supply-chain based two-sided market. The fifth part will be 
discussion on how it contributes to the theory and practical implication. The final party will 
address the future research.  
2 Literature review 
2.1 Two-sided market 
The concept of two-sided market has been introduced to describe the network effects in a 
platform based industry (Varian and Shapiro 1999, Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006, Hagiu and 
Ha\laburda 2014). For example, the apple’s online apps store, the more apps available, the 
more customers would like to subscribe on this platform. Then more customers on apps’ 
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platform, then more developers would to develop apps.  The network effects also take place 
in many other industries, such as e-business, game console industry, card payment (Rochet 
and Tirole 2006, Zhu and Iansiti 2012) and some emerging new industries such as Uber 
rideshare and Airbnb room booking industries. 
There are roughly two ways of network effects. One is direct network effect, the other is 
indirect efforts. The direct effect takes place within the same group, for example, the 
customers on the apps platform would like to share with each other the use experience and 
they will each other generate the network effects (Hagiu 2009) or social bandwagon effects  
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993, Secchi 2009). The indirect network effects take place 
between different sides on that platform(Clements and Ohashi 2005, Stremersch et al. 2007), 
for example, the indirect network effects between apps developers and customers. 
There are many studies over network effects and its determinants(Turrini et al. 2010). Some 
scholars mentioned the product quality and price are the key determinants of network effects 
(Basu et al. 2003). Then, other scholars found the network itself and its structure will 
determine strong network effects, especially strong social tie (Suarez 2005) and centralized 
network structure (Provan and Milward 1995, Turrini et al. 2010). Besides, other scholars 
also addressed some network resource such complementary assets (Tanriverdi and Lee 2008) , 
network context (Provan and Milward 2001) and conducting behavior such as timing of entry 
(Schilling 2002) will impact on network effects(Afuah 2013)  
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2.2 Supply-network based two-sided market 
However the determinants to determine the degree of network effects are still on debate, even 
many scholars test it in the same industry, they did not get the consistent results (Ohashi 2003, 
Rysman 2004, Stremersch et al. 2007). Besides, they also argue on which side to nurture first 
so as to build up a two-sided market. Recently, they come to a preliminary conclusion that it 
was better to nurture the ‘chicken/supply’ side rather than the ‘egg/customer’ side 
(Stremersch et al. 2007). 
In previous studies, the supply side is normally a strategy group composing of same type of 
firms. However, the studies did not explore a supply-chain based side. In that platform side, 
there are different types of firms connecting each other and formulate different supply chain 
system and transform incomplete goods to final ones. All of those types of firms have 
connected with the platform as well. In this situation, the platform owner will not only deal 
with the traditional direct and indirect networks but also needs to facilitate value creation and 
appropriation of whole supply chain. 
2.3 Pricing strategy and IP license model 
In two-sided market, the key thing is how to govern different sides by developing an accepted 
pricing model (Hagiu 2009, Rysman 2009). Taking newspaper as example, the 
customer/reader side is subsidized by the newspaper platform, while the newspaper platform 
will charge the advertisers side. Then, the advertisers are more willing to invest when the 
reader demand increase(Kaiser and Wright 2006). In summary, the pricing structure in this 
industry is charging supply/advertiser side but subsidized the reader/customer side.  
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Such pricing structure is also consistent with Google platform. Google provided all free 
service such as search engine, gmail, gtalk, google map and so on, but charged the advertiser 
on its search engine. However, there are also some opposite cases. Taking Apple platform as 
an example, Apple invested some online platform as iOS, however, they charge almost every 
side, such as customers for the devices, as well as the apps developers. 
In some high-technology industry, IP license business model gains its popularity since it 
decrease the R&D cost and speed up the industry innovation rate (Garnsey et al. 2008). 
Taking ARM as an example, they produced IPs which are the fundamental architecture for 
mobile chips with the basic functions. ARM’s IPs work as a technology based two-sided 
platform, based which, those IC design companies and OEM will develop their products. So 
far there are around 1000 partners on ARM’s two-sided market. Thus those firms formulated 
the supply chain. 
ARM will conduct several key strategies to promote its IP platform.  
First strategy-Ecosystem strategy:  
Since ARM was small at early stage of 1990s and positioned at the upstream of mobile 
supply chain. Thus, ARM hard to persuade direct partners such as Texas Instrument (TI) to 
adopt its IP. However, TI rejected ARM’s offer in early 1990s since ARM was a small firm 
without credit about its IPs. This means, it was hard to run a platform-based business model if 
the company do not have the successful cases. Then, luckily enough, ARM persuaded Nokia 
through social network ties to help. Nokia, positioned at downstream of mobile supply chain, 
who was not the direct partners of ARM and persuaded TI to adopt ARM’s IP since TI was 
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Nokia’s supplier at that time. Nokia used its bargain power and forced TI. From this case, 
ARM significantly learned the power of ecosystem, in another word, indirect partners. 
Following this logic, ARM started to build up a platform based ecosystem, where direct 
partners or in-direct partners all get supports from ARM. ARM organized them to have a 
strong network effects, even though some of the network effects did not take place in ARM’s 
platform. 
Second strategy- subsidized leader partners:  
It was well accepted to have a joint ownership to promote certain IPs (Hart and Moore 1990, 
Maskin and Tirole 1999). Because, many cases of the ex-post negotiation will stimulate the 
joint ownership of IPs (Maskin and Tirole 1999). However, in ARM’s case, the story was 
very different. ARM subsidized the leader partners instead. ARM will not required its 
partners to have shares of its new IPs. Instead they developed their IPs one generation by 
generation and will find and subsidize some leader partners (chip designer such as TI, 
Qualcomm, Freescale) to co-design the IP. ARM gained feedback from leader partners and 
obtained licensee and royalty fee, while leader partners could speed up their chips design by 
firstly adopting the new technologies of chip IPs. In general, ARM subsidized leader partner 
significantly by involving four teams working with leader partners, such as marketing team, 
design team, architecture team and modeling team. All of those teams will facilitate leader 
partners to speed up the design and process to the market. There was no joint-ownership for 
such IPs. ARM only charged the IP license fee and royalty fee by numbers of final goods 
shipment.  
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Third strategy- a novel model of two-sided market 
In 2014, the ARM occupied 98% of worldwide smartphone chip industry, acting as a 
monopolist. However, most of the IC design firms were willing to adopt its IPs and did not 
regarded ARM as a greedy monopolist. ARM acted as the virtual R&D center for those 
leading IC design firms and would charge only very few on license and royalty fee. ARM’s 
revenue was only around 795.2 million GBP in 20141, which is rather a small amount of total 
industry revenue. ARM almost acted as a social enterprise and created a two-sided platform 
with strong network effects and enabled the final goods diversity. ARM did very well to keep 
balance of value creation and value appropriation. Besides, ARM also categorized those 
ecosystem community into three groups: the silicon partners, which have direct economic 
value linkage with ARM; the design support partners, who facilitate those silicon partners to 
better design ARM based chips; the software, training and consortia partners, who are far 
away from the ARM IPs, but help trigger the demand of ARM IPs (for example, training 
companies, consortia platform, research universities, who did not directly license from IP but 
they provide context book and train the engineers who understand ARM technology). In 
summary, ARM not only deal with those traditional sides on the two-sided markets, but also 
support those partners far away from the platform, who maybe based on other two-sided 
platforms. ARM conducted a more cross-platform network effects, which could be regarded 
as a two-sided ecosystem. 
                                                     
1 http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Forecasts?s=ARM:LSE 
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3 Case study 
We have chosen the most successful cases in smartphone chip industry- ARM as Figure 1. 
ARM has dominated the smartphone chips by 98% (www.arm.com) so far, which is 
definitely a strong monopoly in this industry. However, this company is quite popular and 
vary rare to response to law suit. Seen from Figure1, ARM is positioning at the upstream of 
mobile industry which is far from the final goods. After an in-depth case study, we have 
known the way ARM built up its ecosystem and what was the license model to facilitate its 
growth. ARM has realized the importance of ecosystem around its IP platform. Hence, ARM 
not only provided the support to its direct partners but also its in-direct partners. As a result, 
around ARM’s platform, there are around more than 1000 partners so far.  
------------------------ 
Insert figure 1 here 
------------------------ 
Then we summarized the framework as the following figure 2. The developers are the roles 
such as design firms or manufacturing firms or a supply chain of design, manufacturing and 
other firms, while the customers are the final goods customers. As a result, the platform 
owner not only deals with just one kind of developer, instead they deal with supply-chain 
based developers’ groups. The platform owner needs to carefully consider their business 
model to facilitate more complicated network effects, within the supply-chain based 
developers as well as between developers and customers. 
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------------------------ 
Insert figure 2 here 
------------------------ 
By learning from the Case of ARM, we have proposed a model that a firm owning an 
industrial platform with certain external demand. Based on this platform, there will be a 
supply chain of companies and the focal firm needs to support them. Such supporting 
activities will facilitate the network effects between the supply chain and customers. On the 
one side, there are more supplies of diversified chips which will result on more demand. On 
the other side, there are more various demands which generate more supply of diversified 
chips. This is because the mobile computing industry is hugely different from PC industry: 
firstly, the customers have heterogeneous demand for various products such as smartphone, 
tablet and netbook than that in PC industry; secondly, since the customers have huge demand 
of various products, those products with heterogeneity cannot substitute each other very 
much. On contrast, they each will stimulate more demand each other, for example, if you 
have iPhone, it will increase the possibility of your purchase for iPad. On contrast, in PC 
industry, each of us might only need one PC enough.  
The reason we can use the platform concept to represent the relationship of supply chain 
partners is all of them in our case rely on the same common technology, despite their various 
positions along the supply chain. The owner of common technology could be regarded as a 
platform. In terms of ARM, they developed the common technology as IPs for chips. Those 
firms will rely on ARM’s IP and then design and manufacture new generation of chips. From 
10819 
12 
 
ARM’s perspective, ARM also relies on those partners’ new technologies, products and 
production process along the supply chain partners to enlarge its platform scope. This 
matching relationship is also mentioned in technological innovation theories such as common 
technology and complementary technology. The platform theory has provided a great 
framework to analyze such phenomenon.  
4 Theoretical model 
We suppose the platform owner has some basic IPs, base on which new products might be 
developed by its partners. The platform owner charges the partners, by two means, an upfront 
license fee, denoted by L and a royalty fee denoted by r. 
There are two types of firms: A and B firms. These two types of firms connecting each other 
and formulate the two parts of a supply chain. Firms of type A produce intermediate goods as 
inputs of firms of type B. Firms of type B produce final goods for consumers. We suppose 
there will be complete competition for firms of type A, so they have zero profit. Firms of type 
A must pay the license fee to the platform before it begins to produce and also have to pay a 
ratio r of the price for per unit goods. There could be many different types of intermediate 
goods to be developed based on the platforms IPs and we use 𝑢𝑢 to denote a specific type of 
the intermediates and N to denote the total amount of these types. 
The firms of type B gain the intermediates from firms A and then produce final goods. 
Denote the final goods as Y and the intermediates as 𝑥𝑥(𝑢𝑢) for the amount of variety u of the 
intermediates. The final goods production function is supposed to be  
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0
1 ( )
aN
Y x u duβ
αβ
 =   ∫ , (1) 
 
where we have 1αβ < , 0 1α< < , and 1β ≤ . The first condition ensures that the production 
function has a decreasing return to the scale regarding the inputs, x ’s, with given N , while 
the second condition guarantees that the production function has a decreasing return to the 
scale regarding some single ( )x u  and the third condition guarantees that N  has a 
decreasing marginal return with given x ’s.  
For this form of production function, the quantities of α and β  can be used to measure the 
network effects. To achieve that, we assume that ( )x u x=  for all u ’s, then  
 
1Y N xα αβ
αβ
= . 
When we fix total amount of the inputs, i.e. Nx X= , so Y N Xα αβ−= . Therefore when 
1β < ,Y  increases with N  as X  is fixed, which means more types of inputs help the 
production of the final goods and which represents the network effects. Moreover, if the 
product,αβ , is equal to a constant, the greater is α , as the less is β  and the bigger is the 
network effects. On the other hand, when 1β = , the amount of N  has no effect on the 
production, which implies there is no network effect.  
We firstly explore the problem of the production of the final goods to get the demand 
function for the intermediates. Firms of type B have to solve the following optimization 
problem to maximize its profits 
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( )
0 0( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
N N t x
x u
Max x u du p u x u du
α
β
αβ
  −  ∫ ∫ , (2) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥(𝑢𝑢) is the price of intermediate of type 𝑢𝑢 in the term of the final goods. By 
solving this problem we get the demand function for intermediates  
 1 (1 )( ) ( )xx u p u Xβ− / −= , (3) 
where 
1
1
0
[ ( ) ]
N
X x u du
α
ββ
−
−= ∫ .  
Now consider the problem of intermediate producers. Assume each firm of type A can only 
produce one type of intermediates as a monopolist. For example, we can assume that the 
intermediates producer must develop some new patents, based on the platforms IPs to invent 
a new type of intermediates and they will produce the new type as a monopolist once it has 
been invented. So the problem for the producer of a new type of intermediates is  
 
1 (1 )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x
x
Max u r p u x u x u t
s t x u t p u Xβ
π ψ
− / −
≡ − − ,
. . , =
 
Here 𝜋𝜋(𝑢𝑢) is the monopolistic profit for the production of type 𝑢𝑢 and 𝜓𝜓 is the marginal 
production cost. So, from the above optimization problem, we have  
 ( )
(1 )
p u
r
ψ
β
=
−
 (4) 
and 
                   
1 (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 )
( ) [ ]
(1 )
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
x u X
r
u r X
β
β β β
ψ
β
ψπ β
β
− / −
/ − − / −
=
−
= − −
       (5) 
In the equilibrium, each type of intermediates is produced at the same amount, denoted by 𝑥𝑥𝑥. 
10819 
15 
 
Therefore 
(1 )1
1 1X N x
β αα
β β
−−
− −= . Together with equations (5), we have 
 
1
11 ( 1)( ) [ ]
(1 )
x x u N
r
α
αβαβψ
β
−
−/ −= =
−
, (6)  
 
11
1 1 1( ) (1 )( ) (1 )u r N
αβ α
αβ αβ αβψπ π β
β
−−
− − −= = − −  (7) 
Assume to invent the new type, the firm of type A must incur a lump-sum of costs, denoted 
by 𝜂𝜂 , together with the license fee𝐿𝐿 . Because we assume any firm can become an 
intermediate producer after assuming the costs 𝐿𝐿 + 𝜂𝜂, the free entry condition means that no 
incumbent firm could earn positive profit, i.e.  
 
11
1 1 1(1 )( ) (1 )L r N
αβ α
αβ αβ αβψη π β
β
−−
− − −+ = = − −  (8) 
Now we turn to the problem of the platform whose income comes from two parts, the license 
fee and the loyalty. So, it maximizes  
 
. . 0; 0
xLN rNp x
s t L r
Π = +
≥ ≥
. (9) 
From (4), (6) and (8),  
 ( )
(1 )(1 )
rrpx L
r
η
β
= +
− −
 (10) 
So from (8) and (10), the platform’s objective function can represented as  
1 11
1 1 1 1[ ( )](1 ) [ ] (1 ) ( )
(1 )(1 )
rL L r L
r
αβ αβ αβ
α α α α
ψη β η
β β
− − −
− − − −Π = + + − − +
− −
 
We assume the conditions 𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0 and 𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0 on the pricing behavior of the platform. So, the 
solution is reached at interiorly, we must have 0L∂Π∂ =  and 0r∂Π∂ = , otherwise it should be a 
10819 
16 
 
corner solution. After some tedious mathematics exercises, 0L∂Π∂ =  and 0r∂Π∂ =  means 
( 1)
( 1 )
( )1
rL
r
Lr
L
η α
α β β
α η
η β
− + −
=
+ −
+
= −
+
 
And then, we can prove the following statements. 
Theorem 1. Under the conditions of 1αβ <  and 1α < , when 1β < , the model has a unique 
solution where 0L =  and 1r α= − .  
As stated before, when 1β < , the production of intermediates will have network effect on the 
final goods. The variety and size of production of intermediates will have positive impact on 
those of final goods. The optimal pricing strategy could be determined as lowering price and 
encouraging partners enter the platform. Because the platform owner inclines to decrease the 
cost of innovation and production for those firms who produce the intermediate products. 
Hence, it will stimulate more production of intermediates based on the platform technologies. 
As a result, the industry will be scaled up through such network effects. As stated, when 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
is fixed，ifα increases, β will decrease. At this moment, the size and diversity degree of 
intermediates concerning the network effects matters more for the firms who produce final 
goods. Besides, learning from Theorem 1, whenα increases, 𝑟𝑟 decreased, indicating smaller 
royalty fee, which is regarded as the low pricing strategy. In the Theorem1, if 0L = , it 
indicates 𝐿𝐿 position as the corner solution, which indicates the platform owner is willing to 
conduct low pricing strategy as much as possible towards a lowest price. However, it will be 
a different story in real situation, on the one hand, concerning some other factors, the license 
fee should be at least higher than 0. For example, ARM charged a certain amount from its 
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licensers. On the other hand, the platform owner might subsidize partners and make 𝐿𝐿 small 
than 0. For example, due to different types and big numbers of manufacturing firms based on 
ARM platform, ARM will subsidize those manufacturing firms to stimulate the network 
effects. As a result, we can summarize the phenomenon the following corollary.  
Corollary 1. When the network effects are relatively significant, it is more possible that the 
platform will decrease the entry price and encourage more types of goods based on its patents. 
As the network effect increases, the royalty fee decreases.  
Following this logic, we can also have the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.  
Under the conditions of 1αβ <  and 𝛼𝛼 < 1, when 1β = , there does not exist finite optimal 
solution, there always be 𝜕𝜕Π/𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 > 0, which implies 𝑁𝑁 → 0. 
When 1β = , the two parts in the supply chain will not have network effects with each other. 
The theorem states, the platform will set a higher license fee as much as possible in order to 
stop the intermediate producers to enter the platform based ecosystem. However, the number 
(𝑁𝑁) of intermediate producers will not be 0, since the platform owners have to generate some 
revenue by encouraging some certain number of producers to produce and add value the 
platform. As a result, the optimal solution is to have only one intermediate producer, who can 
totally monopolize the platform technology. The equation (8) indicates that the profit coming 
from the monopoly system will be taken away by the platform owner. In this situation, the 
platform owner actually establishes a close industry system where the platform owner could 
monopolize the product design and manufacturing based on its technology. In PC processor 
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industry, Intel was the case we mentioned, who has hugely monopolized the process from 
design to manufacturing of PC chips. This is because, the variety of chip processors do not 
have network effect on PC manufacturing since the PC market is not dynamic. As a result, 
Intel inclines to adopt a close supply chain model. Then, we can summarize a new corollary: 
Corollary 2. When the network effects are relatively weak, it is more possible that the 
platform will control the production, which is based on its patents, like a monopolist.  
5 Discussion 
5.1 Supply-chain based two-sided market 
We have proposed a supply-chain based two-sided market model: in the two-sided market, 
each side is not only connecting with a focal platform, but also connecting each other among 
those sides. Those new connections will formulate supply chains. As a result, the scope of 
network effect was expanded by including the network effects within the supply chain 
upstream and downstream, in addition to the traditional direct and indirect network effects. 
Our model suggests when the network effect is strong, the focal firm will adopt the platform 
based open supply chain model; when the network effect is weak, the focal firm will adopt a 
close supply chain model. These findings also explain why ARM adopted an open supply 
chain platform model while Intel adopted an integrated and close supply chain model.  
Interestingly, these two focal firms both monopolize their own markets in PC and mobile 
industry respectively. However the way of monopoly is hugely different. The Intel is a 
traditional monopolist while the ARM is a monopolist in terms of an open two-sided 
industrial platform. Such new format of monopoly has significant implications for emerging 
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industry development: 
Firstly, from the platform owners’ perspective, they will be motivated to have a monopoly 
platform. Then they will strengthen the network effects in that supply chain by providing 
more promising policies to subsidize and attract new producers. This strategy will scale up 
emerging industries’ output. Secondly, in terms of producers who work on that platform, they 
could dedicate themselves only into such platform and then make good use of the internal 
network effect to decrease the production cost. Since, the supply chain crossing different 
platforms has no or less network effects, the producers could more focus on this single 
platform; thirdly, in terms of whole industry, the competition based on such focal platform is 
a complete competing market, which stimulate various innovation and also relieve the effect 
that monopoly will slow down the innovation activities.  
In addition, we also discuss about the possibility of platforms’ substitution. If the platform is 
more open to its intermediate producers, when the numbers of those producers increase, the 
variety and size of goods will increase as well. In that way, the platform will maintain its 
competitive advantages with low possibility to be substituted by other entrant platform. 
Because if an entrant platform wants to replace an incumbent one, they have to not only 
provide the common technology but also create big variety and size of intermediate goods. 
This is a huge cost: we assume the production cost for the entrant and incumbent platform is 
similar. Following the model we developed, the cost to create a substitute platform will be the 
cost of producing the platform and the intermediate goods. The cost of creating such 
intermediate goods is equals to 𝑁𝑁𝜂𝜂, which is positively associate the number of goods. 
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5.2 Positive monopoly debate 
We still have the debate on the positive monopoly, whether is a general phenomenon or just a 
unique case. Monopoly will slow down the innovation rate, which is already demonstrated by 
many scholar works (Williamson 1968, Reinganum 1983, Iansiti and Richards 
2006).However, the ARM case highly dominated the smartphone industry, but created a very 
innovate business ecosystem. This is really a very strong evidence to challenge the existing 
agreement on the monopoly.  
Through our research, we have proposed some context factors to determine a positive 
monopoly: 
Firstly, the platform owner should provide a fundamental and common platform for this 
industry. The platform owner only provides many basic functions where the other developers 
are reluctant to do the investment by themselves, because these common technologies are 
assumed without economics benefit. For example, some basic functions like audio coding and 
decoding in the smartphone chips. 
Secondly, the license model should guarantee the profit maximization for whole platform 
ecosystem, not just for the platform owner. Because, taking ARM is an example, the revenue 
of ARM only had around 795.2 million GBP in 20142, which was a very tiny part of the 
revenue of the whole smartphone industry as 276.39 billion USD3. Though ARM dominating 
this market by 98% market share, its revenue is so tiny. In other words, ARM is more willing 
to do value co-creation with platform partners, but to do less value appropriation. Hence, as a 
                                                     
2 http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Forecasts?s=ARM:LSE 
3 http://www.statista.com/statistics/237505/global-revenue-from-smartphones-since-2008/ 
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positive monopoly, they should be acting like a social enterprise to contribute more to value 
creation. 
Thirdly, a positive monopoly should have a well-accepted vision for its platform ecosystem: 
for example, Apple’s vision on smartphone against vision of Nokia. The well-accepted vision 
will drive the ecosystem stakeholders work together towards some directions, which will 
leave much space for stakeholders to create value, reduce the transaction cost and approach 
the mature of industry in a shorter period. 
In summary, a positive monopoly should have a clear vision of industry future, provide a 
fundamental platform to other ecosystem stakeholders as well as create more space for value 
creation and appropriate less value as a social enterprise. 
5.3 From two-sided market towards two-sided ecosystem 
There will be three levels of two-sided market: product, platform and ecosystem. In the first 
level of product, like Intel, it is more like a close supply chain model, which acted as an 
internal platform to trigger the internal innovation activities. In the second level, like the key 
business in ARM’s platform, it is a supply-chain based two-sided market. The direct partners 
or supply chain partners will trigger the strong network effects for each other. In the third 
level, like the in-direct partners of ARM, for example, training companies, consortia platform, 
universities, they did not license IPs from ARM but they provided the goods like context 
books and trained the engineers who understood ARM technologies. All of those in-direct 
partners will facilitated the ARM’s platform network effects. We named this as the ecosystem 
partners around the two-sided market. All of those three levels of partners compose of a 
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two-sided ecosystem. 
By learning from those three levels, the next step is to know how to build up such ecosystem. 
The key to build up a platform based ecosystem is to attract more suppliers and customers to 
contribute to this platform. Hence, the degree of stickiness and size of those stakeholders are 
the performance benchmarking for a platform’s success. As a result, how to nurture such a 
platform will be the key question to answer. Our article has addressed on that question 
especially on a supply-chain based two-sided market.  
There are three steps to nurture such supply-chain based two-sided platform. Firstly, it is 
really important for focal firms to attract not only the direct suppliers but also indirect 
suppliers, which might have indirect network effect to the key customers. Secondly, it is 
necessary to identify some key partners in the developers’ sides to nurture them as a loyalty 
member to continuously trigger the innovation of whole platform. Thirdly, it is better to 
diversify the platform offering by involving more stakeholders’ contribution.  
6 Conclusion 
This article has proposed a conceptual model to organize a supply-chain based two-sided 
market as well as demonstrates how the IP license model could better organize this platform 
ecosystem and trigger even stronger network effects. 
Specifically in chips industry, this article is able to explain why Intel and ARM adopted 
different business models. Intel conducted a quite close supply chain model by integrating 
R&D and manufacturing, while ARM established an open platform ecosystem to attract 
thousands of partners to design and manufacture chips on the platform by charging only a 
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small amount of license fee and royalty fee. By learning from the unique case, we have 
proposed a theoretical model of supply-chain based two-sided platform model, where the 
supply chain has strong network effect inside. This model not only explains the difference 
between ARM and Intel’s business model and their success or failure, but also has its general 
implication for other two-sided market theories.  
Our research demonstrates that, when the parts of supply chain have strong network effect to 
each other, the platform owner is more willing to adopt platform based business model; when 
such network effects is weak, the platform owner might adopt a close supply chain model. 
Furthermore, due to the strong network effect, the cost of entering the platform is quite low 
for those partners which also results a more open supply chain. This result indicates the 
difference business model adopted by Intel and ARM is because of weak network effect in 
PC and strong network effect in mobile industry respectively. 
There are both monopolists existing in both close supply chain model and open supply chain 
based platform model. The former is the monopoly in terms of the supply chain level and the 
latter is the monopoly in terms of the platform level. The platform monopoly we regarded as 
a positive monopoly which is different from the traditional monopoly theories. Because this 
platform will accelerate the innovation rate and lower products cost and finally formulate a 
business ecosystem to support this platform based business so as to scale up the industry 
scope. As a result, we called this is a ‘Positive Monopoly’. 
The supply-chain based platform also enriches the business ecosystem theories. This has 
following implications in terms of nurturing business ecosystems: it is necessary to 
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distinguish the roles of the platform owners and other relevant stakeholders; it is necessary to 
further distinguish roles by their nature whether they have strong capability to trigger 
network effects or not. In that way, they could better generate whole ecosystem’s network 
effects; finally, this research also provides the implication to the situation when the supply 
chain itself within the platform ecosystem has the network effect as well as when focal firms 
cope with the external demand outside the platform ecosystem, which generate further 
network effects. 
7 Future research 
There are several ways to conduct the future research: firstly, we need to test those theorems 
and corollaries, by collecting supply-chain based platform data. This is rather a difficulty task. 
Because, the previous studies have only touched the single group of developers, and focused 
on the single industry. In our framework, we needs to have cross-industry data, which is more 
reflecting the real situation of industry development; secondly, we needs to do more case 
studies to obtain more evidence to demonstrate the existence of positive monopoly in order to 
generalize the attributes of positive monopoly; thirdly, in terms of three levels of two-sided 
market from product, platform and ecosystem, we did not touch the ecosystem level. We 
might further develop the theoretical framework of a positive monopoly, especially how they 
organized an ecosystem level’s two-sided platform.  
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Figure 1 ARM’s business ecosystem (Source: Rong and Shi 2014) 
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Figure 2 Research framework 
 
